Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
The issue as to which strategy was adopted and the precise definition of what "near s~multaneous" means is critical to the strategic lift problem. Specifically the challenge is to define g how much lift we need and how much we can afford. In political terms the advertised capability to win two "near simultaneous"
MRCs provides a hedge or deterrent against a potential adversary Borley4 a~tacking a neighbor. This is a possibility while the U.S. is =esp~ni=nG n another region, or this accounts for the ccssib:!i<'y of <he US confronting a larger potential coalition.
One analyse believes that more emphasis is being placed on "near" rather than "simultaneous" and that a gap of at least four to six weeks would occur before heavy forces could be redeployed from one MRC to another. The premise of this article is that the legs of strategic lift: primarily intertheat~r airlift, amphibious lift, sealift, and enhanced throughput measures such as Joint Logistics-Over-
The-Shore(JLOTS) need additional sourcing just to maintain the ODS capability or in other words the ability to move a one MRC force.
Borley5
The Strategic Mobility Problem (Figure l) The BUR identified four phases of U.S. combat operations: The ODS experience provided us with other salient lessons.
We learned that we may have to deploy great distances with very little warning. By air, U.S. forces travelled 7,000 miles from the east coast and I0,000 miles from the west coast. As we look at the geopolitical map, distances from CONUS to future potential MRCs as delineated in the MRS/BUR do not vary significantly from ODS. We have also learned from history that today's allies might not be tommorrow's friends. Despite the tremendous international outcry over Iraq's invasion, the coalition was held together on sometimes shaky ground. We Ray not be so fortunate in a future
MRC. There could be much less popular support. We may have to enter a country that has neither the host nation infrastructure 
The Airlift Problem
The airlift provided during ODS was significant. Airlift The benefits would be immediate availability, and lower cost relative to development and production of another aircraft like the C-17.
Extend service life of C-141: This would extend an existing aircraft with older technology, lower capacity and less efficiency.
• Increased reliance on Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).This
would increase the number of civilian aircraft contracted by the government to support the military during wartime.
The C-17 Dilemma % The C-17 was to be the CINCTRANS answer to its core airlift requirements. The idea behind the development of the C-17 was to find an aircraft that could carry large payloads over a long range, be able to airdrop personnel and cargo, like a C-141, land The issue is whether or not the U.S. should be able to respond to Foreign ships less than five years old can also participate.
USTRANSCOM favors continuation of the Operating Differential
Subsidy which is a higher direct payment to ship operators without offset.
In a step towards maintaining readiness, USCINCTRANS has initiated "no notice" activations of RRF ships to preclude the tardiness encountered during ODS. Six ships were activated between September and November 1993 and all six met the required readiness criteria.
%

Amphibious Shipping
To avoid the ODS mindsAt of free and easy access to modern seaports and airfields, it is imperative that our forward 
Conclusions
The construction of 40 vice the originally MRS validated 120 C-17s will create an unacceptable gap to meet the loss of airlift caused by the retirement of the C-141. Even if an NDAA substitute is approved, there will be a gap caused by the time it takes for the aircraft to reach the fleet. Purchasing or leasing "off the shelf" commercial aircraft ~ight give a boost to our airline industry and meet some of our airlift needs but will fall short in meeting military needs. Increased reliance on CRAF to meet unlikely that all prepositioning ships will be unloaded simultaneously and that forces will likely be sequenced by the supported CINCs, the tremendous distances to be travelled to potential MRCs today with a shrinking airlift fleet may become a bridge too far.
While the improvements in sealift capability are helpful, the larger issue of a self-sustaining U.S. conu~lercial shipping industry to augment future military lift does not look good.
Direct subsidies of the shipping industry through tonnage taxes or direct purchase of ships for MSC charter will fix the short term but not the long term sealift problem.
Lessons learned from OSD can be extremely valuable provided
we pay attention to all th6 lessons. Future conflicts will not likely allow us carte blanche access to modern ports and airfields particularly in lesser developed countries or against potential enemies with weapons of mass destruction and advanced conven~iona! missiles. In this regard we must maintain an airlift fleet which can land on multiple, shorter, unimproved airfields and conduct airborne operations. We must retain forward deployed amph~blous forces which can establish a toehold at these key throughput facilities or surge additional amphibious forces should forcible entry be required to take them back. We must be prepared to conduct LOTS operations should ports become damaged or destroyed. We must be c~pable of surging heavy, sealifted cargo wl~hou~ reliance on foreign ships. We must be capable of getting there from here unilaterally.
Finally, we must be realistic in the assessment of our ends and means in the determination of our national military strategy.
The MRS is a positive step in determining our means. The resolve and resources to attain those means will determine the limits of our ends. While declaring a policy that we can win two "near simultaneous" MRCs may have deterrent value, it is not realistic in terms of our current or near future strategic lift capability.
According to General Hoar, CINCCENT, "Strategic lift in this country is broken right now; the shortage of" long range military cargo planes and fast cargo ships is so severe the military would be hard pressed to fight even one war. TM % We'll get there from here but we'll win only if we get there soon and win quickly.
